WMD Terrorism: The Biological Threat

The anthrax attacks of 2001 made bioterrorism a very real national security threat and issue for the United States. CNP hosted bioterrorism experts Dr. Margaret Hamburg of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and Mr. Brian Finlay of the Stimson Center for an engaging and insightful discussion of this issue. Dr. Hamburg noted that she brought the perspective of a physician-scientist and Mr. Finlay would provide a complimentary perspective from an arms control and nonproliferation perspective, therefore "successful solutions to bioterrorist threats will require scientists and arms control groups to come together into an integrated whole."

Dr. Hamburg noted that despite significant efforts to improve biodefense capabilities in recent years, the US is still not prepared to cope with the threat posed by of biological weapons. A biological attack could produce large numbers of casualties, terror, and panic which are costly and disruptive. She discussed many of the challenges of detecting the development and dissemination of biological weapons, including that they are relatively inexpensive and becoming easier to manufacture, and that pathogens suitable for biological weapons can be concealed and transported with little difficulty. She pointed out that a rudimentary anthrax facility was found by U.S. forces in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and while that particular facility has been disrupted, the desire to pursue bioweapons is certainly still intact by those who would do hard to the United States.

Hamburg shared her belief that while extraordinary advances in modern biology and life sciences offer great hope to improve health and prevent disease, they can potentially be manipulated into dangerous forms by malevolence, misapplication, or sheer inadvertence. She noted that it is tempting to over-define and over-secure science, saying that "we really cannot take microorganisms and put padlocks around the Petri dishes or even around the laboratory walls." She provided three critical elements for thinking through a national strategy for addressing the terrorist threat: (1) the importance of prevention and enhanced intelligence including better human sources, (2) strengthened capacities for early recognition and response case of an attack and, (3) increased investment in research for preparedness and strategies for effective prevention such as strengthening the public health infrastructure for disease surveillance.

Finlay's remarks focused on industry as a different constituency in the discussion of bioproliferation and bioterrorism. He looked at Botox as an example of a product that is made up of the deadliest substance known to man, botulinum toxin, which has been used by governments to make and test biological weapons and has been experimented with by terrorist groups. However, it is also a valuable therapeutic drug which can be used to treat cerebral palsy.  He pointed out that these kinds of dual-use technologies are being produced within a "biotech revolution" driven not by the government sector but by a civilian commercial sector comprised of medium- and small-sized companies around the world, and therefore increasingly outside of government control. He described a "global regulatory nightmare" further complicated by the fact that national security agencies are not collaborating with public health agencies. He argued that the US government should recognize that its' current "guards, guns and gates" approach is increasingly anachronistic. He also emphasized that the critical driver is profit-motivated industries, and that "we have to figure out how we can tap into that motivation to make them see that they need to take a greater role and responsibility in addressing the national security concerns that are arising from the biosciences."