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Securing Loose Nuclear Materials

In a season when candidates are heatedly discussing the most serious national security challenges, many would agree that securing loose nuclear fuels and keeping them out of the hands of terrorists rise to the top of the list. In this vein, CNP invited Dr. Matthew Bunn of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and Laura Holgate of the Nuclear Threat Initiative to lead a discussion focused on the threat posed by terrorists seeking to acquire the ability to construct a nuclear weapon, and the tools available to policymakers to thwart their efforts.

Dr. Bunn began the conversation by outlining three areas of major concern for nuclear security policymakers.  First, is the pervasive corruption surrounding Russia's nuclear facilities.  Although Russia continues to maintain the world's largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, the rules guarding those weapons are lax, leaving officials susceptible to bribes and conspiracies.  Second, although Pakistan's nuclear stockpile is relatively small, it is located within short distance of Al-Qaeda's primary base of operations.  Although these facilities are supposedly heavily guarded, there is significant doubt as to whether they would be able (or willing) to withstand a major coordinated attack by Al-Qaeda.  The final concern is the string of small research reactors which have the ability to produce highly enriched uranium.  Although most of these reactors produce material which is not immediately weaponizable, they are also lightly guarded, providing an accessible target for terrorists.  To rectify these situations, Dr. Bunn advocated a series of comprehensive global standards for nuclear security, to focus on everything from hardened security at the nuclear sites themselves, to the interdiction of nuclear smuggling, to convincing the "hearts and minds" of potential terrorists to eschew the nuclear option. 

Laura Holgate pointed out that there are many activities that corporations, transnational institutions and NGOs can do in security nuclear facilities.  Recommendations such as establishing a norm to de-legitimize the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian projects, and creating a global inventory and risk assessment of nuclear stockpiles would go a long way to identifying long-term threats, and lowering the ambiguity of future nuclear endeavors.  Another positive development would be harnessing the efforts of corporations and NGOs working in the field.  Research centers can be encouraged to convert to low-enriched uranium to reduce the possibility of weaponization, while performance standards can be implemented in existing nuclear facilities to bolster security.  Finally, Holgate argued that the overall quantity of highly-enriched uranium could be reduced through programs such as the U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement, which converted the uranium found in nuclear warheads to civilian power use.