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The Navy's Fighter Gap: Fact or Fiction?

On July 21, 2009 the Center for National Policy hosted a lunchtime forum that focused on one of today's hottest defense topics- the U.S. Navy strike-fighter gap. The event, entitled "The Navy's Fighter Gap: Fact or Fiction?" featured retired Vice Admiral and current president of the Association for Naval Aviation, Robert Dunn and the Congressional Research Service's renown naval expert, Ronald O'Rourke.

The discussion began with Ron O'Rourke arguing there will likely be a strike fighter shortfall assuming the force sizing construct remains the same through the QDR. This is due to a number of factors including F-18 Hornets (specifically the A through D models) reaching the end of their service lives before new F-35s are delivered to replace them. O'Rourke suggested the gap will number from 125 to 243 aircraft sometime between the years 2015 to 2018. Some of the variables influencing the size of the shortfall were discussed by O'Rourke. They included the potential of a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) to extend the service life of older model F-18 Hornets from 8,600 flight hours to 10,000 flight hours (the Senate Armed Services Committee report on FY10 Defense Authorization bill quotes a per aircraft price of $26 million.) The second option would be ramping up the Navy version of the F-35 JSF. A third would be increased procurement of F-18 Super Hornets. And finally, if the force sizing construct is altered in the QDR (specifically the number of carriers) then the number air wings required could shrink. O'Rourke concluded by discussing options for dealing with the projected shortfall in the FY2010 budget; ranging from taking no action to buying more F-18 E/F Super Hornets.

Admiral Robert Dunn continued the discussion by outlining the state of the current Navy/Marine Corps air assets. The Navy/Marine Corps currently require 40 squadrons to be at full strength; currently they have 37 available. This shortfall, along with the wars in Iraq in Afghanistan, has led to over-utilization of the Navy's strike fighter force.

Dunn went on to outline some of the difficulties inherent in trying to squeeze more life out of older model F-18s. He noted that the Navy already went through a process to extend their service life that took aircraft out of the fleet for long periods of time for maintenance and inspection. This had the effect of over utilizing remaining aircraft, requiring still more maintenance and inspections. Because of this, Dunn argued against a SLEP for early model F-18s and suggested the Navy needs to look at other options to address the strike fighter shortfall.

Additionally, Admiral Dunn was not optimistic about the possibility of ramping up production of the naval variant of the F-35 and was skeptical about its feasibility. Instead he advocated strongly for continued procurement of the F-18 Super Hornet. This strategy would have the added benefit of increased capability over extending the lives of older less capable F-18s. In addition this is an aircraft that exists now and the program is on budget and cost.

Ultimately, many observers look to the QDR to define the extent of the problem. The issue of force sizing will ultimately determine the scope of the problem and clarify which strategies would best suit the Navy's strike fighter needs. That means that these decisions will likely have to wait until early next year.