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Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq

America must have a thorough understanding of the countries in which it engages its military prior to conflict.  That was the message delivered by author and consultant Linda Robinson at a policy forum at the Center for National Policy. Robinson, author of the bestselling Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq sat down with CNP president Tim Roemer for a discussion of her book and future policy options in Iraq.

Robinson outlined several mistakes made by US diplomatic and military officials.  She cited the Coalition Provisional Authority's first and second decrees disbanding the Iraqi military and de-Ba'thification of the government as the foremost misstep, as it led to widespread disenfranchisement of Sunnis in the new Iraqi government. 

In other areas, again, Robinson argues American policymakers alienated Iraq's Sunnis and the insurgency by ignoring the effect of American policy on the Sunni community's interests.   "We also took steps to enshrine Shia Islamist parties in positions of power by the manner in which we held those initial '05 elections, and then proceeded with that assembly to write a constitution that enshrined their major interests," Robinson said. 

Unemployed as a result of the Iraqi army's disbanding, exiled from the civil service as a result of de-Ba'thification and constitutionally underserved, Iraq's Sunni insurgency, Robinson argued, grew in large part due to an inability on the part of American policymakers to recognize and address Iraq's Sunni political concerns. 

Iraq's Shia militias, Robinson noted, benefited from an overabundance of American attention paid to violence committed on behalf of Iraq's Sunnis.  "When I would go and see the link diagrams and the whole briefings about the threat, it was really focused on the Sunni side of the equation, and not looking at the Iranian armed Shia side of the equation, which was getting going fairly early on." 

However, by changing strategy and tactics to disperse more amongst the Iraqi people and gain a ground-level appreciation of its concerns, the American military, Robinson said, dramatically improved security for the Iraqi population.  Beset by a barbaric al-Qaeda presence in its midst and Shiite death squads engaged in a campaign of ethnic cleansing, Iraq's Sunni, "were ready to come in from the cold," said Robinson, "but I'd submit, though, is that unless the U.S. had adopted the tactics it did in 2007 and 2008, they would have had no one to come into the cold too because the Iraqi government was not aggressively reaching out its hand to these fellow Iraqis."

Under General Petraeus, a series of tactics were adopted, including most importantly the outreach to insurgents and their supporters, to joint what became the Sons of Iraq, as well as walls to protect markets and neighborhoods, dispersion of troops into those neighborhoods, the use of biometric devices to identify potential insurgents and target the "irreconcilables" more precisely. Shia militias were both courted and targeted, and the turning point was the counteroffensive that Maliki personally against Sadrist forces in Karbala on August 27, 2007. Sadr declared a ceasefire two days later that has held ever since. The spring and summer of 2007 were extremely bloody, but these measures, applied simultaneously, began to have impact.

At the same time, General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker and second-tier Iraqi officials worked throughout 2007 and early 2008 to craft some important legislative compromises and demonstrate that bargains could be struck to win the support of a majority. The January 2009 provincial elections demonstrate that Iraqis want this pragmatic, nonsectarian approach to government – they rejected the most sectarian, pro-Iranian party that had been erroneously supported by the Bush administration. The claims that the successful surge strategy was crafted in Washington are wrong – it was made in Baghdad by Petraeus and Crocker.

Looking to the future, Robinson stressed that U.S. executive branch focus and redlines will be key during a transitional period in Iraqi history, "I think what's most critical is that the White House gives this enough attention, draw some redlines, one big redline ought to be in the very near term.  If the Sons of Iraq are not paid, there should be consequences. The national elections next January must be open list elections. And sectarian targeting must not resume. The next government and parliament will have to broker the major compromises left to end the conflict, with major diplomatic help from the U.S., the U.N. and a group of friends.