Printable Version

Guarding the Gateways: Latest in Port Security

As part of a discussion focused on highlighting issues surrounding port security, the Center for National Policy hosted Cosmo Perrone, Director of Security for the Port of Long Beach, and Bethann Rooney, Security Manager for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.  In a lively and candid discussion moderated by Dr. Stephen Flynn, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relation's, both speakers were asked to address the challenging task of sustaining the ports' vital role as working pieces of critical infrastructure with the security implications arising from their status as potential targets following September 11th, 2001.  Dr. Flynn focused on three specific questions for the speakers, inquiring as to their views on the effectiveness of the federal grant program for port security, the degree of partnership between ports and federal officials, and ports' preparedness to quickly recover from a potential terrorist incident.

Ms. Rooney began by noting the essential nature of partnership given all the cross-cutting jurisdictions associated with the port environment.   She highlighted the close working relationship the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey enjoys with the locally-based US Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection officials in particular. However, she noted that partnerships continued to pose a major challenge, given the rapid turnover of local, state and federal personnel, particularly on the federal side.  Mr. Perrone echoed the importance of partnership pointing to the Port of Long Beach's close integration and connectivity with its neighbor, the Port of Los Angeles, and other California ports as well as information-sharing via the Marine Exchange of Southern California that monitors vessel traffic transiting the West Coast, extending as far as Canada, in an effort to gain greater "domain awareness" to support both efficient and safe port operations and to identify possible security threats. 

Both Rooney and Perrone agreed that further spending on "gates, guns and guards" may achieve diminishing results.  Rooney proposed devoting additional security funds towards essential but alternative security measures, such as personnel and maintenance costs incurred by staffing interagency operations centers, instead of more physical security.

Ms. Rooney explained that work on the port recovery issue had initially been slowed by difficulties among ports in agreeing as to what constitutes recovery and how planning should proceed.  While she stated her belief that progress was being made on these issues, she emphasized the need to build resilience and redundancy into port systems in order to ensure that they could continue to operate or quickly bounce back in the face of major security incident or other disaster.  Dr. Flynn closed noting the challenge ports continue to face in receiving adequate attention and resources even in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th.  He attributed this to the limited understanding by the US public of how ports work and the critical role they play in supporting our economy, as well as the limited appreciation by elected officials, particularly at the federal level, of the unique challenges port officials face in building sound approaches to port security. 

Dr. Flynn posed a question to Rooney and Perrone regarding the linkages between ports and energy needs, specifically in the event of a disruption at the Port of Long Beach, noting that 50% of all of the energy needs west of the Rocky Mountains were supported by oil imported through the Port of Long Beach.  Perrone responded that it is one of the key issues of concern and discussed a recent training exercise that highlighted the enormous stakes and complex interdependencies involved.  The scenario confronted the participants with the difficult situation that if port operations could not be quickly restored, then power generators would be starved of the fuel they needed to generate electricity – and if the power grid went down, the port would be unable to operate. Ms. Rooney noted that NY/NJ is the largest refined petroleum port in the country, and recalled fuel shortages throughout the northeast within hours of the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks. She also noted that a particular source of concern for her was the threat posed by small vessels armed with explosives. A small-boat attack on a deep-draft vessel transiting in a restricted channel could essentially shut down the entire port.

Rooney also advised that planners and risk assessors need to be aware that "You don't need to lose an entire facility in order to have a catastrophic impact." Perrone strongly agreed and noted that "The way that we address business continuity is to address every critical process…. down to sewer system, storm drains, utility lines, water delivery systems, food delivery systems and so forth. And if you can knock one of those out, you've knocked out the port."

• Policymakers should devote more resources, not only towards trying to prevent homeland security incidents at U.S. ports, but also at ensuring that these critical facilities are able to swiftly recover in the event of a man-made or natural disaster.

• The Department of Homeland Security should continue to actively solicit the knowledge and experience of state, local and private sector port stakeholders in formulating additional measures for improving port security.