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The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One

The Center for National Policy welcomed one of the world's most preeminent experts on the topic of counterinsurgency, Dr. David Kilcullen, to discuss his opinions on strategies to achieve stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Dr. Kilcullen addressed the issue in light of both his recent book, The Accidental Guerilla, and his New York Times oped entitled "Death from Above, Outrage Down Below" published days before the talk that calls for an end to US drone strikes in Pakistan.

Dr. Kilcullen, who serves as a Partner in the Crumpton Group and a Board Member at the Center for a New American Security, began by discussing what he believes to be the strategic damage caused by US missile strikes in Northwestern Pakistan.  Likening the drone attacks to "destroying the haystack to find the needle," Kilcullen said that the inadvertent civilian casualties they cause are undermining America's ability to win the support of the country's people against the Taliban and other extremists.  Rather than continuing drone attacks against suspected insurgents and terrorists, which Kilcullen contends only have a success rate of about 2% in hitting their intended targets, he stated his belief that partnering with local groups, aggrieved by the presence of militants in their midst, would be a much more effective strategy is to roll back al Qaeda's presence in Pakistan.

Kilcullen, elaborating on the success of such a strategy in other contexts, cited Indonesia, southern Thailand, the Philippines and the Horn of Africa as places where partnering with foreign governments has resulted in enhanced counterterrorism measures that have reduced the presence and influence of Al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations. 

Dr. Kilcullen explained that much of America's difficulties in its relations with Pakistan stem from the presence of many, often competing power centers in in the country, ranging from the civilian government to the Pakistani army to the ISI. Casting aside the distinctions of Pakistan as "friend or foe," Kilcullen claimed the country's leadership is not coherent enough to be either. In order to build a constructive partnership with Pakistan, Kilcullen argued, we must identify and strengthen those elements in the country who share America's interests for peace and stability in the region. 

Towards that end, Kilcullen argued for an increase in resources and training to the Pakistani police in American foreign aid. This, he believes, will help strengthen what he labeled "the one organization in Pakistan that cares as much about stopping the Taliban as America."

Addressing the balance between defense, diplomacy and development, Kilcullen argued against viewing the funding for the three as a zero-sum game.  Rather, the overwhelming size of America's defense budget relative to civilian foreign policy, he believes, implies that small portions of the defense budget can make dramatic changes in for the Department of State and USAID while having a negligible impact on the Department of Defense.
 

• CNP agrees with the need for additional development assistance as a counterterrorism tool.  As the 9/11 Commission stated, "A comprehensive U. S. strategy to counter terrorism should include economic policies that encourage development, more open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects for their children's future."

• CNP also agrees with the need to better coordinate defense, diplomacy and development activities throughout the government through joint budgeting. As called for in our Agility Across the Spectrum: A Future Force Blueprint, "State and Defense should be required to create a unified strategy and budget for stabilization and reconstruction operations."  

• CNP also agrees with the need for a holistic policy towards Pakistan as called for by the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism.  The Commission noted that "The President and Congress should develop and implement a comprehensive policy involving all elements of national power—military, economic, and diplomatic—to eliminate terrorist safe havens in Pakistan. This policy should also be implemented with regard to Afghanistan, India, China, and Russia."  It also recommended that "the United States should continue to support Pakistan's efforts to eliminate al Qaeda's safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), through increased joint military and intelligence operations. The United States should also support Pakistan's efforts to work with tribal leaders and to strengthen the Frontier Corps and local police."