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Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience

On March 30, 2009, the Center for National Policy hosted Stuart Bowen, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), and the principle author of Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, to discuss the lessons learned from the difficulties surrounding the Iraq reconstruction effort.   Appointed to SIGIR in 2004, Bowen currently provides oversight to the almost $50 billion in funds approved for reconstruction in Iraq.  Before coming to SIGIR, Mr. Bowen served in the Bush administration as Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Staff Secretary and as a Special Assistant to the President and Associate Counsel. 

Bowen argued that the early policy failures of 2003 and 2004 derived in large part from a combination of a rapid and massive policy shift undertaken by an unclear and misapplied chain in command.  While the administration’s reconstruction policy in March 2003 called for US forces to be reduced to 33,000 by August, by May the policy called for a $20 billion budget that would affect every aspect of Iraqi society.  While this drastically increased US commitment was necessary to maintain stability in Iraq, the administration simply did not have the organizational structure in place to handle such a large and complex operation.  Consequently, serious mistakes were made: The Iraqi army, for example, was disbanded, initially reconstituted with only 40,000 men, and ultimately defeated when they were first redeployed in the spring of 2004.  Furthermore, the State Department was initially shut out of reconstruction efforts, and then thrust in the center of operations when the Administration made Iraqi elections a primary policy goal.  The result was a reactive policy that found it increasingly difficult to deal with the growing insurgency and Iranian influence. 

Things started to turn around from the dark months of 2006 with the surge strategy of General Petraeus and Ryan Crocker.  Bowen cites three reasons why the surge succeeded.  First, and most obviously, was that the increase in the number of US troops allowed them to move beyond their forward operating bases and focus on finding and destroying insurgent and AQI weapons caches.  Because the insurgents themselves used guerilla tactics which were invisible to detection, the destruction of weapons caches became a vital tactic in reducing the number of attacks and Coalition casualties.  Second, Muqtada al-Sadr agreed to a cease-fire, largely because of the huge spike in reconstruction projects the US committed to Sadr City.  Finally, the creation of the Sons of Iraq co-opted 100,000 Sunnis, who would have otherwise been insurgents themselves, into a security force that maintained stability and helped to fight Al Qaeda. 

Bowen cites a number of lessons that can be learned from both the initial failures in 2003-2006, and the post-surge recovery in 2007 and 2008.  First, administrations must work to cultivate soft power by investing in human and institutional capacity and building "hard projects" that are actually relevant to the needs of the people in the region.  On a more tactical level, Bowen advocates extensive interagency organization for unforeseen contingencies.  This entails establishing a clear and unified hierarchy of command, continuous oversight to ensure taxpayer money is well spent, and adequate HR management systems within the government to ensure that agencies are properly staffed to handle unforeseen circumstances.  Similarly, the government needs to upgrade their contracting rules to better promote quality assurance.  Finally, a greater effort needs to be made to integrate the functions of the State Department, the Department of Defense and USAID to better handle the unique challenges of post-conflict reconstruction.  Although such reforms may be difficult to undertake, they will ensure that future reconstruction efforts, whether in Afghanistan or elsewhere, do not have to endure the tragic setbacks that were faced in Iraq. 

• CNP agrees with the need for more effective interagency processes to be put in place for complex situations as they arise.  In Agility Across the Spectrum: A Future Force Blueprint, CNP calls for Congress to "expand and monitor the recent establishment of the Consortium for Complex Operations where the institutionalization of stabilization and reconstruction operations can take place."

• CNP agrees on the need for better oversight of taxpayer funds in general, ranging from overseas reconstruction aid to the TARP money being spent at home.  With the fiscal crisis being what it is, Congress and the administration must act to ensure that each dollar of taxpayer money is spent with maximum effect and efficiency. 

• CNP suggests the possibility of creating a permanent special inspector general for overseas contingency operations (SIGOCO).  As Defense Secretary Robert Gates has cautioned, "the kinds of capabilities we will most likely need in the years ahead will often resemble the kinds of capabilities we need today."  Put simply, future contingencies will look more, not less, like Iraq and Afghanistan.  The sooner we institutionalize the skills sets we’ve developed over eight years of trial and error, the less likely they are to be forgotten as they were after Vietnam.  A permanent SIGOCO would prevent the need to reinvent the wheel each time a new crisis and its attendant aid package arise.