



CENTER FOR NATIONAL POLICY

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# **U.S. – Cuba Relations Time for a New Approach**



**A Report of the CNP  
Cuba Policy Advisory Group**

**January 2003**

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The recommendations herein were agreed to by the members of the Advisory Group whose signatures appear at the end of the first section. They participated as individuals; no organization other than CNP is responsible for or associated with any of the contents of this report.

Our sincere thanks to all.

Maureen S. Steinbruner  
President, Center for National Policy

James R. Jones  
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***About the Center for National Policy***

*CNP is a non-profit, non-partisan, public policy organization committed to identifying national issues that require action for common purposes.*

*CNP seeks to move the debate beyond political impasse and partisan stalemate and toward approaches that enhance our economic prosperity, strengthen our democratic institutions and meet our international responsibilities in a way that reflects the shared values of our citizens.*

*CNP brings together leaders in government, business, labor, and academia to explore important domestic and foreign policy issues for the purpose of finding common ground and forging productive relationships that lead to policy innovation.*



# Report of the CNP Cuba Policy Advisory Group

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## INTRODUCTION

Over the past year and a half, the Center for National Policy has convened a special Cuba Policy Advisory Group, chaired by former U.S. ambassador to Mexico James R. Jones and including former government officials and diplomats, business and community leaders, scholars, and representatives from the nonprofit and philanthropic sectors.

The members of the group\* are James R. Jones, Elizabeth Frawley Bagley, Max Castro, Carlos M. de la Cruz, Mathea Falco, William Frenzel, Harriet Fulbright, Mimi Haas, Peter Magowan, Elizabeth Newhouse, Ann W. Richards, Carlos Saladrigas, Alexander F. Watson, Thomas Wenski, and John C. Whitehead.

Ours is one of several such groups that have undertaken an evaluation of U.S. policy toward Cuba. We view our particular contribution to the process as two-fold: 1) helping to frame the Cuba policy debate in terms of U.S. national interests, objectives, and values, particularly in the new national security context that has developed in the past year, and 2) identifying the common ground that often disappears amid the inflammatory rhetoric that too frequently characterizes the Cuba debate.

Despite the diversity of backgrounds and perspectives among our members, we reached consensus on several points that we consider critical in moving toward a policy that more effectively advances U.S. interests and values:

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*\*Dr. Alberto R. Coll also participated in our meetings and discussions in his capacity as a Senior Fellow at the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy. Because Dr. Coll also holds an academic appointment in a U.S. government institution, however, he felt that it would not be procedurally appropriate for him to sign the document.*

- The world has changed. Circumstances in Cuba, the United States, and the international community are very different than they were when the current policy was formulated.
- U.S. interests regarding Cuba have changed. The overriding priority of containing communism has been replaced by a more complex set of concerns, most recently in the areas of counter-terrorism and homeland security.
- A new policy approach is required. After four decades, a policy that centers on isolation has become counterproductive, hindering the pursuit of important U.S. economic and security interests.
- Principled engagement should replace isolation as the core of U.S. policy. U.S. interests and values are best advanced through direct interaction in areas of mutual interest, negotiation of specific disagreements, and open debate on issues of democracy and human rights.

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS**

We recommend the following as key elements of a new policy:

The U.S. and Cuban governments should both acknowledge that moving beyond the current impasse necessarily will involve a process of negotiation.

A moratorium should be imposed on the inflammatory rhetoric that has been characteristic of debate on Cuba policy and U.S.-Cuba relations.

In the U.S., a bipartisan task force of former senior government officials and other experts should be formed, to review the existing body of Cuba-related law and policy and to frame options for a negotiated process of normalization.

The Administration, in collaboration with Congress, should engage in an objective and depoliticized analysis of Cuba's potential as a threat to U.S. national security and either define a clear strategy for dealing with that threat or remove Cuba from the terrorist list.

The U.S. should encourage interaction and exchange between Cuban and U.S. citizens by streamlining bureaucratic requirements and expanding travel. As it opens travel to and from Cuba, the U.S. should also urge Cuba to exercise reciprocity by lifting its own travel restrictions.

The U.S. should pursue all available opportunities to demonstrate goodwill toward the Cuban people and to improve their material well being directly, regardless of the state of relations between governments. This should include 1) removing the limit on remittances; 2) making it less costly and burdensome for Americans to sell food, medicine and medical products to Cuba; 3) expanding the range of products U.S. companies are allowed to sell in the areas of agriculture, clothing and household goods; 4) permitting private but

not public financing of commercial transactions; and, 5) facilitating professional and student exchanges in the fields of medicine and science.

Advocacy and debate regarding democracy and human rights in Cuba should be pursued intensively, within the framework of cooperation with the international community, based on international norms and standards.

The U.S. and Cuba should expand efforts at cooperation in areas of mutual interest such as counter-terrorism, drug interdiction, migration, control of criminal activity, and environmental protection.

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Below, we outline the considerations that have led us to make these recommendations for a new approach to US-Cuba relations.

	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	

*Because I believe the report contains many positive recommendations that, if implemented, would represent an improvement on the status quo, I have decided to sign, despite significant reservations. I believe that breaking the impasse in U.S.-Cuba relations requires a paradigm shift in US thinking regarding Cuba and a bold approach, namely an end of the economic embargo or, at a minimum, ending all travel restrictions and implementing normal free trade in food and medicines. -- Max J. Castro, Ph.D.*

*Dr. Castro is a Senior Research Associate, North-South Center, University of Miami.*

*We fully support the concept of principled engagement, and believe that isolating the Cuban nation does not further U.S. objectives. We further believe that the U.S. should assert that bilateral relations cannot be deemed "business-as-usual" as long as the Cuban government denies its citizens basic political and human rights. Solidarity with the growing and courageous opposition within Cuba should be a clearly articulated policy objective.*

*--Carlos de la Cruz                      --Carlos Saladrigas*

*Messers de la Cruz and Saladrigas are part of the Cuba Study Group, an organization of Cuban-American entrepreneurs and professional. The Cuba Study Group will soon be releasing its own proposals for U.S. Cuba policy.*

## **THE WORLD HAS CHANGED**

Important changes have taken place in the United States, Cuba, and the international context since the 1960s. The “facts on the ground” are no longer what they were when the core of our current policy was formulated.

### **Changes in the International Context**

During the Cold War, the U.S. had reason to be concerned about the existence of a Soviet ally only 90 miles off our shores. As the recent 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis reminded us, Soviet actions in Cuba once posed a grave and immediate threat to our national security. In addition, the island served as a base for the promotion of communism and revolution throughout the hemisphere and beyond.

In that context, a policy of containment and isolation was understandable. With the end of the Cold War, however, these threats to U.S. national security disappeared. Russia and many of the former Eastern Bloc countries have become U.S. allies, and the prospect of communist revolution sweeping across Latin America is no longer credible. The circumstances on which the current policy was based have not been present for more than a decade.

At the same time, the end of the Cold War has resulted in the emergence of new threats and concerns. Weapons of mass destruction are now not only nuclear but also chemical and biological, and the latter are much harder to detect and contain. Unitary state actors are no longer the sole source of national security threats. In addition, ethnic, religious and nationalist impulses have shaken formerly stable countries, resulting in significant inter-group violence, often across borders as well as within states.

The U.S. has been left in the position of sole global superpower, facing a more diffuse set of enemies as well as fresh challenges in relating to traditional allies, former adversaries and international organizations. The U.S. national security and defense policies and practices of the 1980s and 1990s have all come under extensive review as U.S. leaders take these new realities into consideration.

### **Changes in Cuba**

While acknowledging what we consider serious and continuing deficiencies in the areas of democracy and human rights, we observe that there have been significant changes in Cuba over the past few decades.

First, Cuba has curtailed its international program of overt and covert military action. In the past, U.S. officials cited two primary obstacles to the normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba—the presence of Cuban troops fighting in Africa, and Cuban efforts to subvert the governments of its Latin American and Caribbean neighbors. Well before the fall of the Soviet Union, however, Cuba withdrew its troops from Africa and publicly renounced its strategy of “exporting revolution” in the hemisphere.

The loss of Soviet subsidies in the early 1990s and continuing economic difficulties deprived Cuba of the resources necessary to revive its earlier international forays.

Between 1989 and 1993, Cuba's imports fell by 80 percent and its gross domestic product by 35 percent. Lacking critical inputs and spare parts, some of the island's primary industries, including its two primary hard-currency generators—sugar and mining—nearly ground to a halt.

The crisis resulted in a series of limited but important changes in Cuba's economic system. The government has opened major sectors of the economy to foreign investment, with notable exceptions such as health, education and defense. It has allowed farmers to sell surplus production directly to consumers, and authorized limited self-employment and small enterprise.

Long-subsidized state enterprises are now required to be self-sufficient and can offer production incentives to employees. The possession and circulation of hard currency, previously punishable by prison time, has been legalized, resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in family remittances from Cubans living abroad.

This series of modest but important reforms has put Cuba on the path to an economy that provides some space for private initiative and increasingly responds to the imperatives of the global market rather than the dictates of central planners.

Some Cuban government officials have characterized this economic reform process as a necessary evil. Whatever their reservations, however, it would probably be impossible at this point for Cuba to reverse course, and the government has acknowledged as much. The state will likely maintain a strong presence in the economy overall and exclusive control of sectors such as health and education, but elements of private enterprise are likely to survive and ultimately to expand.

### **Changes in the United States**

When the Cuban government came into power in 1959, approximately 65 percent of the current U.S. population had not yet been born. An additional 18 percent—including the baby boomer generation—were not yet of voting age. Nine U.S. presidents and nearly a half-century later, a fundamentally static U.S. policy towards Cuba stands in sharp contrast to these dynamic demographics.

Particularly during the past decade, U.S. public opinion has begun to shift significantly in the direction of engagement with Cuba. A number of recent polls conducted by Gallup and other independent polling organizations showed a modest majority of Americans favoring an end to the U.S. trade embargo and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba. According to an April 2002 Gallup poll, only 13 percent view Cuba as a threat.

Opinion in the Cuban-American community has also shifted. A poll commissioned by the Cuba Study Group, an organization of Cuban-American business leaders in Miami, found that 45% of Cuban-Americans think that the embargo has not worked, 52% favor replacing it with a new approach, and 46% support unrestricted travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens. A 2000 poll by Florida International University generated comparable numbers—51% supporting dialogue with the Cuban government and 53% supporting unrestricted travel. An identical poll conducted by FIU in 1991 resulted in figures of 39% and 45%, respectively.

In Congress, members of both political parties have also begun to line up with the small minority of long-time critics of isolation. Responding to a shift in public opinion as well as increased advocacy by the business community, many have grown more supportive of legislation loosening certain elements of current policy. The sale of food and agricultural products on a cash basis was authorized in 2000 under the Trade Sanctions Reform Act.

Several other proposed changes in U.S. policy have gained momentum in Congress in the past several years as well, demonstrated most recently by House votes on several amendments to the 2002 Treasury-Postal Appropriations Bill, including the following:

- An amendment eliminating funding for the enforcement of the ban against travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens passed with 262 votes.
- An amendment eliminating funding for the enforcement of limitations on the amount of cash remittances that Americans can send to individuals in Cuba passed with 251 votes.
- An amendment eliminating funding for the enforcement of restrictions on private U.S. financing of agricultural sales passed by a voice vote.
- An amendment eliminating funding for the enforcement of all elements of the U.S. embargo failed to pass but received 204 votes, 47% of those cast.

The Treasury-Postal Appropriations Bill containing these amendments was never brought to a vote in the Senate, though similar legislation has passed overwhelming in the Senate in past years. In both houses of Congress, views on engagement with Cuba have been shifting, with pro-engagement forces gaining steadily.

### **U.S. INTERESTS REGARDING CUBA HAVE CHANGED**

U.S. national security interests guided the formulation of our current Cuba policy four decades ago and continue to be a high priority, but the national security threats that the U.S. faces today are very different.

Terrorism has replaced communism as the principal focus of U.S. national security strategy, dramatically altering the calculus of U.S. interests in the world's few remaining communist countries.

Once discussed primarily in terms of its status as a Soviet satellite, Cuba now arises in the context of the war on terrorism and the degree to which it is assisting or hindering U.S. efforts.

A number of other U.S. interests regarding Cuba have also begun to emerge, including issues such as trade and investment, migration, drug interdiction, environmental protection, and medical and scientific research. Greater political and economic freedom in Cuba remains high on the U.S. agenda, yet many Americans believe this should no longer be the sole—or even the primary—focus of U.S. policy toward the island.

### **National Security Interests**

The most important national security threats currently posed by Cuba stem from the potential for political and social instability on the island.

U.S. interests will be harmed if the Cuban government becomes incapable of detecting and thwarting activities that threaten our well-being, including terrorist activity, uncontrolled migration, drug trafficking, and organized crime, issues of increasing concern today elsewhere in the region. The intensification of economic hardships in Cuba also threatens U.S. interests, potentially provoking waves of uncontrolled migration to U.S. shores, as happened in 1994 when the post-Soviet Cuban economy reached its lowest point.

By seeking to ratchet up political, economic and social tensions in Cuba rather than alleviate them, the U.S. risks a counterproductive destabilization of the island that could open the door to various threats to U.S. national security. A violent transition is strongly contrary to our national interest; a peaceful evolution in Cuba would be much more beneficial.

U.S. policy toward Cuba also has the potential to affect U.S. national security indirectly via our relations with key allies. For example, aspects of the 1996 Helms-Burton Act threaten foreign allies in Cuba and their executives with political and economic consequences if they are found to be profiting from property expropriated by the Cuban government in the early years of the Revolution. Presidents have waived application of these provisions, which raise problematic issues of extraterritoriality.

### **American Principles and Values**

U.S. interests in Cuba include the promotion of deeply rooted American principles and values, including the practice of democracy and respect for human rights, which are important not only from an intrinsic moral and ethical perspective but also from a standpoint of U.S. security interests.

We firmly believe that a country can only be stable and prosperous in the long term under a political system that rests on the consent of the governed and respect for their fundamental rights. Failure to satisfy these criteria creates the conditions for political and social tensions that can ultimately lead to instability and even violence, provoking uncontrolled migration and refugee

flows, disrupting regional commerce, and placing potential burdens on the international community for ensuring security in the region. Clearly none of these outcomes is in the U.S. interest.

However, the question of how best to encourage respect for political rights is complex. U.S. policy toward Cuba largely has been ineffective in this area, failing over the course of four decades to achieve its stated objective of a “peaceful transition to democracy.” U.S. concerns about human rights and political freedoms are legitimate, widely shared and validated in international accords, but the history of U.S.-Cuba relations diminishes the effect of unilateral U.S. pressure. This pressure has helped to reinforce Cuba’s closed, one-party political system by serving as the credible external threat that justifies forced internal cohesion.

### **Economic Interests**

While internal failings and external pressures have kept Cuba’s economic system from reaching even a fraction of its potential, the country does offer opportunities for U.S. exports and investment. Since November 2001, Cuba has purchased \$125 million in food from U.S. producers and recently signed contracts for an additional \$95 million. Total food imports are currently estimated at \$1 billion per year. As Cuba moves inevitably—albeit slowly and fitfully—toward a more market-based economy, the size of that market is likely to increase.

Cuba also exports a number of products that are otherwise unavailable in the U.S. market or whose substitutes are lower in quality. Cuba’s biotechnology industry, for example, has developed effective meningitis and hepatitis vaccines to which Americans have no legal access, while some of Cuba’s more traditional exports, which have always enjoyed a reputation for superior quality, also cannot legally be imported.

Current policy excludes U.S. businesses and individuals from virtually all export and investment opportunities and gives other countries a head start in positioning themselves to take advantage of future ones. It prevents U.S. consumers from purchasing products from Cuba. And it does not provide an effective mechanism for the resolution of intellectual property disputes or expropriated property claims.

### **Other U.S. Interests**

In areas such as scientific research, drug interdiction, environmental protection, and natural disaster response, the effectiveness of various U.S. government agencies and non-governmental organizations depends in part on communication and coordination with their Cuban counterparts. Barriers and limitations on communicating and coordinating with Cuban officials limit the effectiveness of U.S. efforts in these areas.

## **THE HISTORICAL POLICY NO LONGER SERVES U.S. INTERESTS**

Neither the U.S. government's stated objectives regarding Cuba, nor its strategy for achieving them, are aligned with current U.S. national interests. Its exclusive focus on the objective of promoting a political transition is too narrow, excluding important U.S. economic opportunities and security interests. In addition, its confrontational tactics have been counterproductive, reinforcing Cuban defensiveness and resistance to change rather than encouraging openness and reform.

As a nation, the U.S. has historically promoted frank and open exchange with other nations as the best way of exporting our core values of freedom, democracy, and respect for law. It was part of the U.S. approach toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the Cold War, and it is an integral aspect of current U.S. policy toward China and Vietnam.

The U.S. does not benefit from the all-or-nothing mindset of across-the-board isolation of the Cuban government. An approach that employs a combination of negotiation, cooperation, and advocacy would be both more effective and better aligned with our foreign policy toward the rest of the world.

U.S. interests would also be better served by a greater interaction with Cuba's leaders. Current U.S. policy prohibits travel by senior Cuban government officials to the U.S., severely restricts communication between U.S. and Cuban government officials in Havana, and discourages interaction between Cuban government officials and visiting U.S. delegations. In doing so, the U.S. cuts itself off from any meaningful relationship that it might hope to have with Cuba's future leaders.

Two generations have been born since the U.S.-Cuba conflict began in the 1960s, and during that time young new Cuban leaders have risen to positions of influence in government and in society. In our judgment, few things reveal our policy's lack of long-term vision and strategy more clearly than the decision not to engage this group of individuals.

Restrictions on travel to the U.S. by Cubans outside the government, while less stringent, produce the same negative effect of isolating the U.S. from talented scientists, scholars, writers, artists, engineers, musicians, athletes, doctors, and professionals in various other fields as well as, importantly, students at all levels.

U.S. policy would benefit as well from a better understanding of the complex political dynamics that exist within Cuba at present. It has been observed that one of the biggest obstacles to change in Cuba is the fear of change among the Cuban people—government officials as well as the general population.

In Cuba, natural human aversion to risk and uncertainty is aggravated by specific concerns about U.S. domination and even retribution. A review of U.S. influence and intervention in Cuba over the past century should make such concerns unsurprising. One way for the U.S. to encourage positive change in Cuba, then, is to alleviate Cubans' fears by adopting a clear

message of U.S. support for freedom, prosperity, and self-determination on the island.

The condescending and coercive overtones often present in U.S. government actions and statements tend to communicate the opposite message and reinforce a hostile image. Economic sanctions provide a convenient scapegoat for the country's economic failures. Unilateral demands for political and economic reforms are rejected as subversive in intent, even when such reforms might be in Cuba's own interests. Aggressive rhetoric reinforces a bunker mentality, stifling internal debate and undermining the individuals and groups in Cuba that favor greater openness.



## RECOMMENDATIONS

### **Time for a New Approach**

U.S. interests and priorities, as well as Cuba's own domestic and international situation, have evolved significantly over the past forty years. The policy crafted to address Cold War national security concerns that no longer exist does not well serve the current stated objective of promoting a peaceful transition to democracy, and neglects other important objectives altogether. A policy of isolation and confrontation does not serve U.S. interests. We recommend emphasizing an approach based on principled engagement and negotiation of specific issues.

### **A Negotiated Process of Normalization**

It is time for the U.S. and Cuban governments to acknowledge that moving beyond the current impasse will necessarily involve a broad process of negotiation, covering more than the limited topics negotiated in the past. Both the U.S. and Cuba have pursued a strategy whose success depends on the unilateral surrender of the other side. In neither case is this a realistic expectation.

U.S. demands for political change in Cuba as a precondition to changes in U.S. policy have reinforced a spirit of defiance. The Cuban government appears to be nowhere near the point of yielding to U.S. demands, nor do most analysts believe the system is on the verge of collapse. For its part, Cuba has been seeking normalized relations strictly on its own terms. The Cuban government's public rhetoric is frequently extreme, indicating little if any willingness to compromise.

The U.S. has a right to assert its core values of democracy and human rights in its relations with other nations, but the long-standing unilateral U.S. effort to isolate Cuba has not noticeably advanced these goals. Cuba has a right to assert its sovereignty, but its demand for unilateral and complete policy change on the part of the U.S. is unlikely to be fulfilled.

An approach based upon principled engagement could allow both countries to address issues of mutual concern while advancing a broader relationship through a process of dialogue and negotiation, where important issues can be addressed and resolved. This has been the approach used with other nations of great emotional and political concern, such as the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam.

Several specific issues would seem to lend themselves to mutually beneficial solutions if both parties are willing to enter into serious negotiations with minimal or no preconditions. While the details are more appropriately left to the negotiators, we believe that it should be possible to move toward agreement on such issues as a) resolution of expropriated property and frozen assets claims; b) full normalization of travel and communications; c) criteria for investment and trade that reflect values as well as interests; and, d) issues of mutual concern such as terrorism, drug trafficking, international criminal activity, migration and the environment.

### **Step One: A Moratorium on Rhetoric**

A moratorium should be imposed on the inflammatory rhetoric that has been characteristic of debate on Cuba policy and U.S.-Cuba relations.

Differences and disagreements should not be covered up; on the contrary, they must be aired before they can be negotiated and resolved. However, personal attacks against U.S. government officials, Cuban government officials, or Cuban Americans serve no constructive purpose.

On both sides of the conflict, harsh rhetoric has strengthened the most extreme factions, hindered the emergence of civil discourse and debate, and prevented the resolution of negotiable differences. A "cooling off period" during which all parties refrained from such rhetoric would be a step in the right direction and should begin immediately.

### **Step Two: A Domestic Political Framework for Moving Forward**

A high-level bipartisan task force of former senior government officials and other experts should be formed to review the existing body of Cuba-related law and policy and to frame options for a negotiated process of normalization.

This task force should make recommendations for a coherent policy framework that more accurately reflects current priorities and circumstances. It should provide representation for national and regional security concerns, economic interests, humanitarian values, and democratic principles. It should reflect a broad spectrum of public opinion and include various Cuban-American perspectives.

This task force should be selected by the leadership of both parties in Congress and by the Administration. It should have a specific time to report its findings.

### **Step Three: Immediate Action on Issues of U.S. Interest**

The U.S. should act immediately on several policies that directly relate to U.S. national interests and the rights of U.S. citizens.

Since these actions are in the interest of the United States and can be implemented unilaterally, they should be taken regardless of the Cuban response. However, they should also foster a more constructive environment for bilateral negotiations, clearing away the roadblock that has resulted in part from both sides' reluctance to take the first step.

#### National Security

The Administration, in collaboration with Congress, should engage in an objective and depoliticized analysis of Cuba's potential as a threat to U.S. national security. If Cuba is truly a state sponsor of terrorism and does

represent a genuine threat to U.S. interests, as has been asserted, then the U.S. must define a clear strategy for dealing with that threat.

If, on the other hand, as most analysis seems to suggest, Cuba does not pose a credible threat to U.S. national security, then it is in the U.S. interest to remove Cuba from the terrorist list and focus attention and resources on the growing list of actual threats.

Travel and Exchange

The U.S. should encourage interaction and exchange between Cuban and U.S. citizens by streamlining bureaucratic requirements and expanding travel and educational exchange.

During 2002, officials at OFAC indicated a shift to a more restrictive policy on travel licensing, indicating that this shift reflects concerns about the improper use of licenses by persons outside the authorized categories. However, it also appears to reflect a broader policy directive that regulations on travel to Cuba should be interpreted more strictly than they were under previous administrations.

Travel by Cubans to the U.S. also fell dramatically as a result of the steps taken after Sept. 11 to require greater scrutiny of visa applications from individuals living in countries on the State Department's terrorist list. Individuals who have traveled to the U.S. on numerous occasions in the past now find their applications delayed for three or more months, effectively eliminating the chance to take advantage of opportunities that arise on short notice. This includes artists, scientists, academics and others invited by U.S. institutions to participate in conferences and cultural activities.

Both of these steps go in the wrong direction. They reduce the exchange of ideas between Americans and Cubans and undermine the goal of greater openness on the island. The U.S. should instead move toward the elimination of restrictions on travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba and the loosening of restrictions on Cubans wishing to travel on short-term visas to the U.S., including senior Cuban government officials.

While such travel does provide greater resources and legitimacy to the Cuban government in the short term, it also generates important long-term benefits in terms of U.S. policy objectives. Such travel is a means of promoting the beliefs and values that Americans as a people consider fundamental. In addition, Americans traveling to Cuba generate economic opportunities for the Cuban people in the form of direct and secondary employment, leading to a higher standard of living and greater economic autonomy. On balance, the benefits of greater travel and people to people interaction far outweigh the costs.

As it opens travel to and from Cuba, the U.S. should also urge Cuba to exercise reciprocity by lifting travel restrictions on Cubans wishing to leave and re-enter the country. Most problematic is the Cuban government's requirement that its citizens apply for an exit permit before being allowed to travel abroad. This requirement is incompatible with the "right to leave any

country, including [one's] own, and to return to [one's] country," as articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which Cuba is a signatory.

A related concern, expressed especially by some in the Cuban-American community, is that travel requests from certain Cubans living abroad have been denied based on political and ideological grounds rather than legitimate considerations such as national security. Without questioning the right of a sovereign country to secure its borders, the U.S. should call on Cuba not to discriminate against visa applicants without cause and monitor the situation so that problems can be addressed promptly.

#### Humanitarian Concerns

The U.S. should pursue all available opportunities to demonstrate goodwill directly toward the Cuban people and to improve their material well-being, regardless of the state of relations between governments.

*The U.S. should remove the limit on remittances that can be sent legally to friends and relatives in Cuba.* These remittances have helped millions of Cubans survive severe economic hardships and serve as one of the clearest and most concrete gestures of support from individual Americans to individual Cubans. They have also given many Cubans a greater degree of economic autonomy, including the ability to establish small private businesses.

*The U.S. should make it less costly and burdensome for Americans to sell food, medicine and medical products to Cuba.* Licensing and reporting requirements, shipping restrictions, and other bureaucratic regulations should be streamlined or eliminated.

*Private, but not public, financing should be permitted for commercial transactions currently authorized solely on a cash-only basis.* At the same time, the U.S. government should make it clear that it will not bail out U.S. lenders if Cuba fails to meet its obligations.

*The U.S. should expand the range of products that U.S. companies are allowed to sell to include other basic necessities such as agricultural equipment and supplies, clothing and household goods.* None of these are likely either to enrich the Cuban government significantly or to be used for purposes contrary to U.S. security interests.

*The U.S. should facilitate exchange and cooperation in the area of medical research and medical practice.* Limitations on professional exchanges between U.S. and Cuban scientists and the transfer of non-sensitive technology should be eliminated.

**Step Four: A Multilateral Approach to Democracy and Human Rights**

Advocacy and debate regarding democracy and human rights in Cuba should be pursued in cooperation with the international community based on international norms and standards.

U.S. policy over several decades has been concerned as much with the issue of Cuban internal policies as with its international activities. Throughout these years, U.S. policy has been confrontational and dedicated to isolation, challenging Cuba's sovereignty, while Europe and Canada have pursued direct interactions. Both approaches have produced only limited results.

International cooperation in this area would be both more effective and more appropriate than the unilateral approach that the U.S. pursued in the past. Moreover, the practicality of multilateral action has increased with growing European and Latin American dissatisfaction over the Cuban government's failure to take even modest steps toward a political opening and greater respect for human rights. The U.S. and its allies in Europe and Latin America share many of the same beliefs and values in this area. Coordination with our allies under a framework of principled engagement would enable the U.S. to promote the values of democracy and human rights in Cuba more effectively.

**Step Five: Increased Cooperation in Areas of Mutual Interest**

The U.S. should increase cooperation in areas of mutual interest such as counter-terrorism, drug interdiction, migration, and environmental protection. Serious differences in other parts of the relationship should not preclude collaboration on issues of vital interest to both countries.

The U.S. has already taken several steps in this direction on the issue of migration, directly negotiating migration accords with the Cuban government, meeting on a regular basis to review their implementation, and engaging in limited cooperation to deter and prosecute people smugglers. Another positive step has been the posting of a U.S. Coast Guard attaché at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana and particularly the authorization of communication between the attaché and Cuban officials regarding cases of drug trafficking and illegal migration. While no direct cooperation exists in the area of environmental conservation, the U.S. has also opened limited space for collaboration between U.S. and Cuban academic and non-profit organizations.

By almost all accounts, the limited governmental and non-governmental cooperation that has been tried has been successful.

It is in the U.S. interest to expand cooperation in these areas and extend it to others, including the exchange of military attachés, the inclusion of Cuba in regional counter-narcotics efforts, and the authorization of collaboration between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and their Cuban counterparts.

**CONCLUSION**

Americans inherently value the idea of dialogue, and the peaceful resolution of disputes through negotiation. While there are circumstances in which principled engagement is not appropriate, we believe that the U.S. will most likely achieve its objectives with respect to Cuba through negotiation rather than isolation. We recommend that Congress and the Administration take steps to adopt this approach.



## ABOUT THE CNP CUBA POLICY ADVISORY GROUP

**James R. Jones** (Chair) is Co-Chairman of Manatt Jones Global Strategies and Senior Counsel at Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP. President Clinton appointed Jones U.S. Ambassador to Mexico in 1993. At the time of his appointment, Jones was Chairman and CEO of the American Stock Exchange, as he had been since 1989. Prior to heading AMEX, Jones represented Oklahoma's 1<sup>st</sup> Congressional District in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1973-1987. While in Congress, Jones served on the Ways and Means Committee and spent four years as Chairman of the House Budget Committee. Before his election to Congress, Jones was an attorney in private practice in Tulsa and served as President Johnson's Appointments Secretary (Chief of Staff). He holds a BA from the University of Oklahoma and a JD from Georgetown Law School.

**Elizabeth Frawley Bagley** serves as Senior Managing Director of Manatt Jones Global Strategies, LLC and is of counsel at Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP. Prior to joining Manatt Jones, she served as Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State from 1997-2001, where she established and headed the Office of Media Programming Acquisition for the newly independent Balkan states. She also served as a Senate liaison for NATO Enlargement. Prior to her position at the State Department, Ambassador Bagley served as U.S. Ambassador to Portugal from 1994-1997. An attorney specializing in trade and international law, she was Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University in Washington until January 1993. Ambassador Bagley served as Diplomatic Liaison for the Clinton-Gore Presidential Campaign and as Foreign Policy Advisor to the Drafting Committee for the 1992 Democratic Party Platform, as well as the 2000 Gore Presidential Campaign. She held the position of Congressional Liaison Officer in the Department of State during the Carter Administration and was Special Assistant to Ambassador Sol Linowitz for the Camp David Accords. She also served as Congressional Liaison to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Ambassador Bagley holds a BA from Regis College and a JD from Georgetown University Law School.

**Max Castro** is a Senior Research Associate at the North-South Center at the University of Miami. His work focuses on refugees and migration in the Western Hemisphere, democratic governance, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. He is the former Executive Director of Greater Miami United, a nonprofit corporation that develops cooperative race and ethnic relations in South Florida. He also served as Director of the Vista Institute of Hispanic Studies, a private organization that conducts research on Hispanic issues and promotes the welfare of the Hispanic population in the United States. Castro is the author of *Free Markets, Open Societies, Closed Borders? Trends in International Migration and Immigration Policy in the Americas* (North-South Center Press, 1999). He is also a regular columnist for *The Miami Herald*. Castro holds a PhD in sociology from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

**Alberto R. Coll, Ph.D.** is a Senior Fellow at the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy at Salve Regina University. Dr. Coll was born in Havana, Cuba and came to the United States in 1968. From 1990 to 1993, he served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. Dr. Coll is the author of two books, *The Wisdom of Statecraft* and *The Western Heritage and American Values*. His articles have appeared in the *Wall Street Journal*, *Foreign Policy*, and numerous scholarly journals. Dr. Coll is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations Cuba Task Force, and has been a consultant for the U.S. Institute of Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Ethics and Public Policy Center, the Foreign Service Institute, and the United States Information Agency. He also has served as a consultant on Cuban affairs to the Defense Department and the RAND Corporation. He received a BA from Princeton University, and a JD and a PhD from the University of Virginia.

**Carlos M. de la Cruz** is Chairman of the Board of Eagle Brands, Inc., the exclusive Anheuser-Busch wholesaler in the Miami Dade County, Florida and Coca-Cola Puerto Rico Bottlers. He currently serves on the Board of Trustees of the University of Miami and until recently was, Chairman of the Board. From 1993 to 1995, he was Chairman of the Board of Directors of the United Way of Dade County and Campaign Chairman in 1991. Mr. de la Cruz received a BS in Economics and an MBA in Finance from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, in 1962 and 1963, and a Juris Doctorate from the University of Miami School of Law in 1979. He has received numerous honors including the Alexis de Tocqueville Award from the United Way and the Silver Medallion Brotherhood Award from the National Conference of Christians and Jews.

**Mathea Falco** is President of Drug Strategies, a non-profit research institute in Washington, D.C., which promotes more effective approaches to the nation's drug problems. The author of *The Making of a Drug Free America: Programs That Work* (Times Books, 1994), Ms. Falco comments frequently on drug policy in the media and in public speeches across the country. Until 1993, she was Director of Health Policy, Department of Public Health, Cornell University Medical College in New York City. From 1977-1981, Falco was Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters. Earlier, she served as Chief Counsel and Staff Director for the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee, Special Assistant to the President of the Drug Abuse Council, and Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ms. Falco is a graduate of Radcliffe College and Yale Law School. She has served on the Board of Overseers of Harvard University; the Board of Trustees of Radcliffe College; the national boards of Girl Scouts, USA; Big Brothers of America; the International Women's Health Coalition; the Ploughshares Fund; and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. Ms. Falco is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

**William Frenzel** is a Guest Scholar in Governmental Studies at the Brookings Institution. He focuses on a number of issues relating to policy and economic affairs, including international financial institutions, trade policy, and the WTO. Frenzel served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1971-1991. He was a member of the House Budget Committee and House Administration Committee, and the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee. He was also the Congressional Representative to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Frenzel holds a BA and an MBA from Dartmouth College.

**Harriet Fulbright** is President of the Fulbright International Center. She currently serves on numerous boards including the Wendy and Emory Reves International Center, World Learning, The Academy of Educational Development, and the National Foreign Language Center. From 1997 to 2001 Ms. Fulbright was Executive Director of the President's Committee on the Arts and the Humanities. Prior to this, she served as Unofficial Ambassador for the 50th anniversary of the Fulbright Program and in that capacity traveled to 16 countries to speak about the importance of international education exchange. Fulbright has taught at numerous educational institutions including Maret School and American University and has taught abroad in Seoul, Korea and Moscow, USSR. She received a BA from Radcliffe College and an MFA from George Washington University. She was awarded an Honorary Doctorate in Law from the University of Scranton, an Honorary Doctorate in Humane Letters from Long Island University, and an Honorary Doctorate of Letters from Bank Street College of Education.

**Mimi Haas** is President of the Miriam and Peter Haas Fund. She serves on the boards of the Haas Center for Public Service at Stanford University, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and the Terry Sanford Institute for Public Policy at Duke University. A member of the Council on Foreign Relations, she holds a BA from the George Washington University.

**Peter Magowan** is President and Managing General Partner of the San Francisco Giants. Since assuming the club's reins in 1993, Magowan has been the recipient of many community awards including the Commonwealth Club of California 1993 Distinguished Citizens Award and the Special Achievement Award for Outstanding Leadership and Commitment to HIV/AIDS Awareness at the 1995 AIDS Update Conference. Both the *San Francisco Business Times* and the *Sport's Business Journal* named Magowan Executive of the Year in 1993 and 2000, respectively. Previously, Mr. Magowan spent 25 years with Safeway, Inc. where he was Chairman and CEO for 13 years. Magowan serves as a director on the boards of Safeway, DaimlerChrysler A.G., and Caterpillar, Inc. He holds an undergraduate degree from Stanford University, and a master's degree in politics, philosophy, and economics from Oxford University.

**Elizabeth Newhouse** directs the travel publishing program at the National Geographic Society, where she has been an editor and writer for more than 20 years. Raised in Cuba, she has visited there frequently beginning in 1980. She lectures about the history and culture of the island and is the author of *Cuba* (National Geographic, 1999). Born in Brazil, Newhouse has also worked for the Latin America division of the Peace Corps.

**Ann W. Richards** is a Senior Advisor at Public Strategies, Inc. with special responsibilities for the New York office. In 1991, Richards became the 45<sup>th</sup> Governor of Texas – the first woman elected to that job in her own right. Prior to her current position, Richards worked with a Washington law firm as an advisor while teaching a course at Brandeis University. She has also served as Texas State Treasurer and as a Commissioner on the County Commissioners Court. She is a member of several boards including Brandeis University, JCPenney, Grupo Modelo, the Aspen Institute and Save the Children Foundation.

**Carlos Saladrigas** is Chairman of Premier American Bank in Miami. He is also a director of Progress Energy (NYSE:PGN). In 1984 he co-founded the Vincam Group, Inc., which he led through an IPO in 1996 and later merged with Automatic Data Processing Inc. (ADP) in 1999. Previously, Saladrigas held various positions at PepsiCo, Inc., and worked for Arthur Young and Peat Marwick. A CPA and a CMA, Saladrigas holds an associate's degree from Miami-Dade Community College, a BA in business administration, cum laude, from the University of Miami, and an MBA, with honors, from Harvard University.

**Alexander F. Watson** is Managing Director of Hills & Company, international consulting firm in Washington, D.C. Until recently, he was Vice President and Executive Director for International Conservation at The Nature Conservancy. He also served as President of the Pan American Development Foundation 2000-2002. Previously, he was a career foreign service officer for over thirty years, serving in his last assignment as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from 1993-1996. He has served as U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations with the rank of Ambassador from 1989 to 1993. He served in Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, including as Ambassador to Peru (1986-1989) and Deputy Chief of Mission in U.S. embassies in Brazil, Colombia and Bolivia. He also served as Director of the Office of Development Finance and as liaison with Congress on international economic issues. Ambassador Watson is a graduate of Harvard College and the University of Wisconsin.

**Thomas Wenski** is Auxiliary Bishop at the Archdiocese of Miami. Bishop Wenski was ordained to the priesthood in 1976 and ordained to the episcopacy in 1997. Wenski is Archdiocesan Director of Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami directing Catholic Relief Services, the Campaign for Human Development and the Disaster Relief Service. In January 1985, Wenski was assigned Director of Haitian Apostolate. Since then he has worked as a Pastor at Notre Dame d'Haiti Church (1985-1998), Divine Mercy Haitian Mission (1988-1998) and St. Joseph Haitian Mission (1985-1998). Wenski has received several awards for his service to others including the St. Vincent de Paul Award to outstanding priests

(1987) and the Charles Whitehead Spirit of Excellence Award by the Miami Herald (1994). He has written several articles appearing in various publications including the *Miami Herald*, *The Sun Sentinel* and *Crisis Magazine*. He published a religious tabloid, *Lavwa Katolik*, the first Creole-language newspaper in the United States and was Editor from 1981-1989. He holds a BA and a Master of Divinity from St. Vincent de Paul Seminary, an MA from Fordham University.

**John C. Whitehead** serves on numerous boards, including The Nature Conservancy, Lincoln Center Theater, and the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships. After a 38-year career at Goldman, Sachs & Co., including eight years as Senior Partner and Co-Chairman, he served as Deputy Secretary of State from 1985-1989. He holds an undergraduate degree from Haverford College and an MBA, with distinction, from Harvard University.

*CNP Cuba Policy Advisory Group Members who participated in CNP-sponsored travel to Cuba are: Max Castro, Mathea Falco, Harriet Fulbright, Mimi Haas, James Jones, Peter Magowan, Elizabeth Newhouse, Ann Richards, Alexander Watson, and Thomas Wenski.*



## AGENDAS & ITINERARIES

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**Center for National Policy**  
***TOWARD A U.S. CUBA POLICY FOR THE FUTURE***  
**NOVEMBER 4-5, 2001**  
**WASHINGTON, DC**

AGENDA

Sunday, November 4

- 7:30 p.m. DINNER — U.S. CUBA POLICY: NATIONAL INTERESTS, NATIONAL VALUES - WASHINGTON COURT HOTEL
- **Randy Beardsworth**, Georgetown University; **Mark Falcoff**, American Enterprise Institute; **Al Fox**, Alliance for Responsible Cuba Policy; **Brian Latell**, Georgetown University; **Brian Moran**, Office of Senator Byron Dorgan; **Andrea Panaritis**, The Christopher Reynolds Foundation; **Richard Nuccio**, Pell Center for Int'l Relations and Public Policy; **Philip Peters**, Lexington Institute; **Silvia Wilhelm**, Puentes Cubanos

Monday, November 5

- 8:30 a.m. MEETING – CNP U.S. CUBA POLICY ADVISORY GROUP
- 9:30 a.m. MEETING – U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS: OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE (PART ONE)
- **Dagoberto Rodríguez**, Cuban Interests Section in Washington
- 10:45 a.m. PRESENTATION – RECENT TRENDS IN THE CUBAN ECONOMY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS AND POLICY
- **Philip Peters**, Lexington Institute
- 10:45 a.m. PRESENTATION – PUBLIC OPINION PERSPECTIVES: CUBAN AMERICAN AND OTHERS
- **Max Castro**, University of Miami; **Carlos Saladrigas**, ADP TotalSource
- 10:45 a.m. PRESENTATION – DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN POLICY
- **Richard Nuccio**, Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy
- 10:45 a.m. PRESENTATION – CHANGING ROLE OF EXCHANGES IN THE U.S.-CUBA RELATIONSHIP
- **Silvia Wilhelm**, Puentes, Cubanos
- 12:45 p.m. LUNCH – PRESENTATION – MADISON ROOM
- **Bernard Aronson**, ACON Investments
- 2:00 p.m. DISCUSSION – ISSUES OF INTEREST AND/OR CONCERN, AND DELEGATION PLANNING
- 3:30 p.m. MEETING – U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS: OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE (PART TWO)
- **Dan Fisk**, Heritage Foundation

CENTER FOR NATIONAL POLICY  
CUBA POLICY ADVISORY GROUP  
*DELEGATION TO HAVANA: JANUARY 16-21, 2002*  
HAVANA, CUBA

ITINERARY

Wednesday, January 16

7:00 p.m. DINNER - HOTEL SOFITEL

Thursday, January 17

10:05 a.m. ARRIVE IN HAVANA

12:00 p.m. MEETING – RESIDENCE OF U.S. INTERESTS SECTION CHIEF

- **Vicki Huddleston**, U.S. Interests Section; **Jeffrey DeLaurentis**, U.S. State Department; **Louis J. Nigro**, U.S. State Department; **Peter Corsell**, U.S. State Department

12:00 p.m. CUBAN HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION REPRESENTATIVES

- **Gustavo Arcos Bergnes**; **Oswaldo Diaz**; **Rene Gomez Manzano**; **Oswaldo Alfonso Valdez**

1:00 p.m. LUNCHEON & DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADORS – HOSTED BY **AMB. & MR. HUDDLESTON**

- **Alfredo Duarte Costa, Embassy of Portugal**; **Luciano Martins de Almeida, Embassy of Brazil**; **Helga Konrad, Embassy of Austria**; **Jesus Manuel Gracia Aldaz, Embassy of Spain**; **Elio Menzione, Embassy of Italy**; **Michael Small, Embassy of Canada**; **Bernd Wulffen, Embassy of Germany**

4:00 p.m. MEETING – MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

- **Felipe Perez Roque**

6:30 p.m. MEETING – CLUB HAVANA

- **Ricardo Alarcon**, President of the National Assembly

8:00 p.m. DINNER - CLUB HAVANA, HOSTED BY RICARDO ALARCON

Friday, January 18

8:00 a.m. DEPART HOTEL - SUB-GROUP MEETINGS

MEETINGS/SITE VISITS – GROUP I

- Ministry of Public Health; **Dr. Jose Portilla**
- Children’s Heart Hospital (Hospital William Soler); **Dr. Diana Martinez**
- Visit to elementary and middle school

MEETING/SITE VISITS – GROUP II

- Meeting at the Ministry of Science; **Dr. Cristobal Felix Diaz Morejon**, **Jorge E. Fernandez Esperon**, **Roberto Perez de los Reyes**, **Jorge L. Fernandez Chamero**

C E N T E R F O R N A T I O N A L P O L I C Y

- Visit to Crafts Market
- Visit to Aquarium

8:00 a.m. MEETINGS/SITE VISITS - GROUP III

- Meeting at the Ministry of Basic Industries: **Minister Marcos Portal, Antonio de los Reyes Bermudez, Hilda Ortiz Garcia**
- Briefing at the Center for Genetics Engineering and Biotechnology (CIGB): **Dr. Luis Herrera Martinez, Dr. Carlos G. Borroto, Ernesto Lopez Mola**

3:30 p.m. MEETING –DIOCESE OF HAVANA

- **Cardinal Jaime Ortega y Alamino**

4:30 p.m. MEETING – GROUP I – CARITAS CUBANA

- **Maritza Sanchez, Jose Ramon Perez**

MEETING – GROUP II – JEWISH COMMUNITY CENTER

- **Dr. Jose Miller, Adela Dworing**

MEETING – GROUP III – MASONIC GRAND LODGE (JOSE MARTI LIBRARY)

- **Gustavo Pardo**

6:00 p.m. MEETING - DEPUTY MINISTER OF THE ECONOMY

- **Alfonso Casanova Montero**, Deputy Minister of Planning and the Economy

8:00 p.m. PRIVATE DINNERS

Saturday, January 19

8:00 a.m. DEPART FOR PINAR DEL RIO

10:45 a.m. STOP AT ENTORNO DE HERRADURA

11:30 a.m. MEETING – DIOCESE OF PINAR DEL RIO

- **Bishop Jose Siro Gonzalez Bacallao**

12:30 p.m. LUNCH - CAFÉ PINAR DEL RIO

1:30 p.m. MEETING – AT THE DIOCESE OF PINAR DEL RIO

- **Bishop Jose Siro Gonzalez Bacallo**, Diocese of Pinar del Rio; **Dagoberto Valdez**, Vitral Magazine; and other representatives from the Center for Religious and Civic Formation

6:00 p.m. PRESS CONFERENCE - PARQUE CENTRAL HOTEL

7:00 p.m. DINNER - CAFÉ DEL ORIENTE

- **Monsignor Carlos Manuel de Cespedes; Dr. & Mrs. Rolando Suarez; Dr. Pedro Monreal; Ambassador Ricardo Pasco Pierce; Miguel Coyula**

Sunday, January 20

Morning **CHURCH/ EXPLORATION TIME**

- Visit to Ludwig Foundation, visit to artists' homes

**CENTER FOR NATIONAL POLICY  
CUBA POLICY ADVISORY GROUP  
EXECUTIVE TRIP – MARCH 27-29, 2002  
MIAMI, FLORIDA**

Thursday, March 28

- 10:00 a.m. CONFERENCE: THE TIME IS NOW TO REASSESS U.S. POLICY TOWARDS CUBA
- OVERVIEW OF POLICY/REFLECTIONS ON CHANGE **Ambassador James R. Jones**, Chair, CNP Cuba Policy Advisory Group
- 12:00 p.m. CUBA STUDY GROUP - LUNCHEON & DISCUSSION, EAGLE BRANDS, INC.
- Members, Cuba Study Group

**CENTER FOR NATIONAL POLICY  
CUBA POLICY ADVISORY GROUP  
MEETING – MAY 7-8, 2002  
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

AGENDA

Tuesday, May 7

- 12:30 p.m. LUNCHEON: STATUS OF THE U.S. POLICY DEBATE (PART I)
- The U.S. Congress: **Cindy Buhl**, Office of U.S. Rep. James P. McGovern; **Philip Peters**, Lexington Institute
  - Remarks on Center for International Policy delegation to Cuba, led by U.S. Sen. Barbara Boxer: **Wynn Segall**, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld
- 2:00 p.m. DISCUSSION: THE MIAMI COMMUNITY
- **Max Castro**, The University of Miami; **Carlos de la Cruz**, Eagle Brands, Inc.; **Silvia Wilhelm**, Puentes Cubanos
- 3:30 p.m. DISCUSSION: STATUS OF THE U.S. POLICY DEBATE (PART II)
- The Bush Administration: **Peter Kasperowicz**, Cuba Trader
- 4:30 p.m. DISCUSSION: GOALS OF U.S. CUBA POLICY (PART I)
- **Dennis K. Hays**, Cuban American National Foundation
- 7:30 p.m. DINNER – RESIDENCE OF THE CUBAN INTERESTS SECTION CHIEF
- **Dagoberto Rodriguez**, Cuban Interests Section

Wednesday, May 8

- 10:00 a.m. DISCUSSION: GOALS OF U.S. CUBA POLICY (PART II)
- Cuba Today: **Gillian Gunn Clissold**, CNP Cuba Policy Consultant
- 11:30 a.m. - 4:30 p.m. LUNCHEON/ REPORT DISCUSSION

CENTER FOR NATIONAL POLICY  
CUBA POLICY ADVISORY GROUP  
*STAFF TRIP – SEPTEMBER 7 - 13, 2002*  
MIAMI, FLORIDA & HAVANA, CUBA

ITINERARY

Saturday, September 7 – Friday, September 13

**MEETINGS:**

- Maria de la Luz B'Hamel, **Director of Foreign Trade Policy, Ministry of Foreign Trade**
- Rafael Rojas, **Director, Master Plan for Old Havana, Office of the City Historian**
- Alfonso Casanova, **Vice Minister, Ministry of Economy and Planning**
- Eugenio Martinez, **Deputy Director for Cubans Residing Abroad, Ministry of Foreign Affairs**
- Lexy Tejeda, **Ministry of Culture**
- Leonel Gonzalez, **Sec. For International Relations, Cuban Workers Union**
- Miguel Alvarez, **Advisor to the President of the National Assembly, Ricardo Alarcon**
- Juan Jose Leon, **Director of International Relations, Ministry of Agriculture**
- Roberto Yebra Munoz, **Ministry of Foreign Investment**
- **Center for Psychological and Sociological Research (CIPS)**
- Benigno Reguera, **Vice President, Central Bank of Cuba**
- Lourdes Tabares, **Vice Rector for International Relations**
- Milagros Martinez, **Advisor, University of Havana**
- Fernando Ramirez, **First Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs**
- Luis Cunarro, **Center for Defense Studies**

CENTER FOR NATIONAL POLICY  
CUBA POLICY ADVISORY GROUP  
*MEETING – NOVEMBER 12, 2002*  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

AGENDA

November 12, 2002

- 9:00 a.m. BRIEFINGS AND DISCUSSION
- **Josefina Vidal**, Cuban Interests Section
  - **Bob Filippone**, Majority Deputy Staff Director, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Advisor to U.S. Sen. Bob Graham
  - **Kevin Whitaker**, Coordinator, Office of Cuban Affairs, U.S. Department of State
  - **Lance Walker**, Legislative Assistant, Office of U.S. Representative Jeff Flake
  - **Terrence Taylor**, President and Executive Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies – US, and former UNSCOM Chief Inspector
  - **Bruce Blair**, President, Center for Defense Information
  - **Glen Baker**, Center for Defense Information
- 12:00 p.m. LUNCHEON
- **Emilio Gonzalez**, Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs, National Security Council

CENTER FOR NATIONAL POLICY  
CUBA POLICY ADVISORY GROUP  
*GROUP TRIP – NOVEMBER 17-20, 2002*  
MIAMI, FLORIDA, & HAVANA, CUBA

ITINERARY

Saturday, November 16

- 2:00 p.m. ARRIVE MIAMI HILTON AIRPORT TOWERS
- 7:00 p.m. DINNER – CUBAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY
- **Marifeli Perez-Stable**, Florida International University; **Sergio Bendixen**, Cuba Study Group; **Ernesto de la Fe**, Cuba Study Group; **Enrique Sosa**, Cuba Study Group

Sunday, November 17

- 3:30 p.m. ARRIVE HAVANA AIRPORT JOSE MARTI
- 5:00 p.m. PERFORMANCE - NATIONAL FOLKLORIC DANCE COMPANY
- 7:30 p.m. DINNER - UNIVERSITY OF HAVANA RESEARCHERS
- **Luis Rene Fernandez**, Center for the Study of the United States; **Lazaro Luis Gonzalez**, Center for the Study of the United States; **Jorge Hernandez**, Center for the Study of the United States; **Milagros Martinez**, University of Havana; **Jorge Mario Sanchez**, Center for the Study of the United States; **Lourdes Tabares**, University of Havana

Monday, November 18

- 9:00 a.m. MEETING – ALIMPORT
- **Pedro Alvarez**, Director
- 11:00 a.m. MEETING – SOL MELIA HOTEL
- **Rodolfo Davalos**, Cuban
- 1:00 p.m. LUNCHEON – U.S. PRESS
- **Anthony Boadle**, Reuters; **Alexandra Olson**, Associated Press; **Anita Snow**, Associated Press
- 3:30 p.m. SITE VISIT/BRIEFING - CENTER FOR GENETIC ENGINEERING AND BIOTECHNOLOGY
- **Dra. Sonia Negrin Martinez**, **Manuel Raices Perez-Castaneda, Ph.D**
- VISIT - EXPERIMENTAL GRAPHICS WORKSHOP – GROUP I
- **Juan Carlos Menendez**, Principal Specialist
- 7:00 p.m. DINNER – CULTURAL COMMUNITY – GROUP II
- **Abel Barroso**, artist; **Julio Carranza**, UNESCO; **Mario Coyula**, architect and urban planner; **Helmo Hernandez**, Ludwig Foundation; **Nelson Herrera**, Wilfredo Lam Center; **Pedro Monreal**, University of Havana; **Isabel Rigol**, University of Havana

C E N T E R F O R N A T I O N A L P O L I C Y

Tuesday, November 19

- 8:30 a.m. MEETING – MINISTRY OF TRADE
- **Raul de la Nuez**, Minister of Trade
- 11:00 a.m. VISIT - YOUTH COMPUTING CLUB
- 1:00 p.m. MEETING - UNIVERSITY OF HAVANA RESEARCHERS
- **Lazaro Luis Gonzalez**, Center for the Study of the United States; **Jorge Hernandez**, Center for the Study of the United States; **Jorge Mario Sanchez**, Center for the Study of the United States; **Lourdes Tabares**, Vice Rector, University of Havana
- 3:00 p.m. TOUR - OLD HAVANA
- 5:00 p.m. MEETING – MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
- **Fernando Remirez**, First Vice Minister
- 8:00 p.m. DINNER - RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY
- **Adela Dworing**, Jewish Community Center; **Enrique Lopez Oliva**, University of Havana (retired); **Orlando Marquez**, Archdiocese of Havana; **Rev. Hector Mendez**, Association of Christian Youth; **Dr. Jose Miller**, Jewish Community Center; **Jorge Calzadilla**, Center for Psychological & Sociological Studies

Wednesday, November 20

- 8:30 a.m. BREAKFAST & DISCUSSION – CUBAN HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION REPRESENTATIVES
- **Oscar Elias Biscet**, Lawton Foundation for Human Rights; **Felix Bonne**, Internal Dissidence Working Group; **Rene Gomez Manzano**, Internal Dissidence Working Group; **Marta Beatriz Roque**, Internal Dissidence Working Group, Cuban Institute of Independent Economists, and Assembly for the Promotion of Civil Society
- 11:30 a.m. MEETING – HOTEL PARQUE CENTRAL
- **Oswaldo Paya**, Christian Liberation Movement, and founder of the Varela Project
- 12:30 p.m. CONCLUDING SESSION
- **Fernando Remirez**, First Vice Minister, Foreign Relations